Tuesday 4 February, however, changed that discourse: the first local coronavirus transmission was detected. MOH confirmed four cases, none of whom had recently travelled to mainland China. Three of these had had contact with recent travellers from mainland China. The fourth had not, but was a domestic worker for one of the three. This change in circumstances took infection possibilities to a new level, with the negative impact on aggregate demand and supply growing correspondingly larger. If up until then the strategy was one of border control, that strategy now needed to change to containment and social distancing.
Three days after that, on Friday 7 February, Singapore’s Disease Outbreak Response Condition (DORSCON) was raised from yellow to orange, indicating the novel coronavirus outbreak was now estimated to have a moderate to high public health impact. Across the island, inessential large-scale events were cancelled or postponed. Universities and businesses put up thermal screening stations, and twice-daily temperature reporting by every individual was mandated. Soon thereafter a new category of medical isolation, stay-home notification (SHN), was introduced, in severity between a quarantine order (QO) and an LOA. Both QOs and SHNs attract the full force of the law under the Infectious Diseases Act, and so carry legal penalty.
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